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Right of Alien to Hold U. S. Lands.-Billings et al. v. Asen Mining
Co. etal., 5i Fed. Rep. 338. Sec. 2319 Rev. Statutes 
declares, " that
all * * * mining deposits in lands belonging to the U. S.
* * are free * 4 * to exploration and purchase * *
by citizens of the U. S. and those who have declared their inten-
tion to become such." Shiras J., held, in the above case, that 
this
did not exclude an alien who, with others, had explored and located
on such lands from holding the same against all the world except
the U. S., though he was not a citizen and never intended 
to
become one. "To hold that, after Wood had expended time,
labor and money in prospecting and locating the mine, they 
could
oust him therefrom * * * would be nothing short 
of
legalized robbery." This right of ouster resides alone in the 
U.
S., which might, by proper proceedings, deprive him of the bene-
fits of holding the location through the right of escheat. 
The
question of the descent of such lands, to the heirs of the alien,
would, however, be regulated by'the laws of the State in which
said lands are situated, and not by the Federal statutes.
Constitutional Law-Jurisdiction of State and Federal Courts.-
In re Fox, 51 Fed. Rep. 427. A person under bail to answer an
indictment in a federal court was arrested and confined 
for a
crime against the State of California on habeas corpus proceedings;
the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Cali-
fornia decided that in the absence of any conflict between 
the
State and federal authorities as to the custody of the criminal, 
he
could not be discharged from custody of the State officers by vir-
tue of the federal indictment against him.
Permanent Damages - Transfer of Title - Mitchell et al. V.
MAetropolitan El. .'y Co. et al., 31 N. R. Rep. 260 (New York).
Damages were awarded in the court below to 
plaintiff for
easements taken on his property by defendants in operating
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their road, and defendants were enjoined from further opera-
tion until they paid a certain further amount for permanent
damages. Defendants claimed that they had already paid for
these under the following circumstances. One Schmarr (formerly
the owner of said property) in i88o brought a corresponding action
for the permanent depreciation of the same property by the same
company, but before trial, died, leaving a will. Letters testa-
mentary were issued by the Probate Court to the executors
appointed by him, who continued the suit and obtained judgment
for all losses sustained and to be sustained. The Court instructed
the jury that the verdict rendered would be full compensation and
bar another suit. Defendants objected claiming that damages
should be awarded only for past injuries. The judgment was
sustained, however, and the amount paid. Meanwhile the Courts
had declared Schmarr's will invalid, and the property was sold at
auction to present plaintiff. Did he acquire the easement, already
paid for, thereby? Parker J., says: "Only temporary damages
should have been awarded to Schmarr, because the appropriation
of the easements by defendants being unlawful was, presumably,
not permanent (.Pond v. R. _R., X12 N. Y., x86). This award
would be a bar to another suit, only when, (i) defendants had
acknowledged permanency of the intended use and acquiesced in
the increased damages (Lake v. R. R., 104 N. Y. 268-293, or (2)
if plaintiff had effectually vested the title in the real estate in the
trustees, who obtained judgment. In fact he died intestate, the
title, all easements and the claim for future damages vested in his
heirs at law (Sheoherd v. -R. R., i17 N. Y. 442; Kernochan v. R.
-R., 128 N. Y. 559). Testator's claim for temporary damages,
prior to his death, alone descended to his executors (Shepherd
case, supra; Griswold v. 2?. R., 122 N. Y. 102). The Court did a
great injustice to defendants when they allowed the executors a
recovery of permanent damages, "but the consequences cannot
be shifted to him upon whom has devolved the title to the estate
of which Schmarr died seized."
Construction of Deed- Restrictions. -Field v. City of Providence,
24 Atl. Rep. 143. A recent number of the Atlantic Reporter
records a Rhode Island case of some interest, which for some
reason has been overlooked since its decision in 1887 and never
before printed. It seems that in 1791 a certain John Field con-
veyed to a number of his townsmen a parcel of land to be used
for a burying ground, and for no other purpose; after nearly a
century of such use the city of Providence. passed an act setting
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aside a certain portion of this burying ground as a public park,
and thereupon a descendant of the grantor sued the city for his
reversionary right to the land. The court, following the prece-
dent laid down in Rawson v. Inhabitants, 7 Allen 125, held that the
grant carried an absolute estate in fee simple with it, and that as
the price paid seemed to have been the full value of the land at
the time no reversionary interest could be left in the heirs of the
grantors, especially as from the deed it would appear that the
provision that the land should be used as a burying ground was
inserted more in the interest of the grantees than grantor.
Evidence- Communication by Telephone.- Oskamp5 v. Gadsden, 52
N. W. Rep. 718, decided by the Supreme Court of Nebraska
June 11, 1892, discussed the interesting question of the admissi-
bility of evidence of conversation held over the telephone.
Defendant at Schuyler attempted to converse over telephone with
plaintiff at Omaha, but owing to condition of atmosphere they
were unable to understand each other and the telephone operator
at Fremont, an intermediate station, transmitted defendant's mes-
sage to plaintiffs offering to sell them a quantity of hay, and also
repeated to defendant their answer accepting the proposition. It
was contended that the testimony of defendant as to what the
operator repeated to him as the conversation progressed was irrel-
evant and hearsay; but the court held that it was admissible on
the ground of agency. "The question thus presented is a new
one to this court and there are but few decided cases which aid us
in our investigation. But upon principle it seems to me that the
testimony is competent, and its admission violated no rule of
evidence. It was admissibl on the ground of agency. The
operator at Fremont was the agent of defendant in communicating
defendant's message to Haines, and she was also the latter's agent
in transmitting or reporting his answer thereto to defendant.
The books on evidence, as well as the adjudicated cases, lay
down the rule that the statements of an agent within the line of
his authority are admissible in evidence against his principal.
Likewise it has been held that when a conversation is carried on
between persons of different nationalities through an interpreter,
the statement made .by the latter at the time the conversation
occurred as to what was then said by the parties is competent
evidence and may be proven by calling persons who were present
and heard it." The court cited People v. Ward, 3 N. Y. Crim. R.
483; Wolfv. Railway Co., 97 Mo. 473; Prindtng Co. v. Stahl, 23 Mo.
App. 45x, and Sullivan v. Iuykendall, 82 Ky. 483, as cases in which
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the subject of telephonic conversation had' been considered, and
quoted with approval from the opinion in the Kentucky case:
"When one is using the telephone if he knows that he is talking
to the operator he also knows that he is making him an agent to
repeat what he is saying to another party; and in such a case cer-
tainly the statements of the operator are competent, being the
declaration of the agent, and made during the progress of the
transaction."
Gifts Causa Mortis- Evidence - Constructive JDelivery - Bank
Pass Book.- Thomas' administrator v. Lewis, 15 S. E. Rep. 389
(Va.). This was an action brought to establish a gift causa mortis
of an entire personal estate consisting of money and choses in
action, valued at $200,ooo. The alleged donor had died at the
age of seventy, unmarried and intestate. The claimant was his
illegitimate daughter by a former slave. It appeared that the
deceased had educated his daughter liberally, had built a dwelling
house for her and her husband, and was residing with them at the
time of his death. He had frequently declared that his collateral
relations should not share in his estate, and that his daughter
should have it all. The only person who testified to the fact of
the gift was the daughter's household companion. The Supreme
Court held, one judge dissenting, that the gift was valid, except-
ing a pass-book showing the amount of donor's deposits in a
national bank. The judge that wrote the opinion took strong
ground for the validity of this gift also. The opinion is an elabo-
rate discussion of the subject of gift9 causa mortis, and contains a
valuable collection of citations. The court says: "The circum-
stance that there is but one direct witness to the gift, competent
to testify (the appellant declining to allow the donee as a witness
when offered) does not affect the validity of -the gift. One wit-
ness, if credible, is sufficient. The law does not require more
than one; and especially, as in this case, when that one is not
only unimpeached, but corroborated." -Iatch v. Atkinson, 56 Me.
324, is in point. Declarations as to the circumstances of the gift,
made the day after by the donee and her companion are compe-
tent evidence, both as part of the res gestz, and to rebut inferences
sought to be drawn from an adverse witness as to the donee's
silence in regard to the matter two days later. "Nor does the
magnitude of the gift affect its validity. It may extend to the
whole of the donor's personal estate." The common law, unlike
the Roman, does not limit the amount of personal estate subject
to gifts causa morris. Delivery is hel&to be essential, but construc-
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tive delivery is always sufficient when actual manual delivery is
either impracticable or inconvenient. So the gift in this case of
the keys of a box containing bonds and other securities, deposited
in the vaults of a bank was decided valid. It would be interest-
ing to know the reasons of the majority of the judges for holding
invalid the gift of a pass-book lately written up showing the
deposits of the donor in the same bank.
Zandlord's Liability to Guest of Tenant for Defective Premises.-
Hart v. Cole, 3 N. E. Rep. 644 (Mass.). The plaintiff while
leaving a wake held in the part of a tenement house occupied by
a tenant of defendant, by the outside steps, was injured by a
defect in the stairway, negligently allowed by defendant to
remain, and now sues for damages. Plaintiff had not been invited
to the wake, nor was she a friend or relative of the deceased.
Knowlton J., says: "This case presents for consideration impor-
tant questions never before decided in this comnionwealth. The
defendant in this case would be liable to a visitor of the tenant
for the steps, if the tenant himself would have been so liable had
he owned them. It has *been held (Plummer v. Dill, 31 N. E.
Rep. 128) that a person visiting premises fitted up for business
purposes, on business of his own not connected with the business
actually or apparently carried on there, is a mere licensee to whom
the owner is liable only for traps and injurious acts negligently
done to his prejudice. The same is true as regards one visiting a
dwelling house without express invitation, and solely for his own
convenience or profit. "How far an implied invitation is held out
under all conceivable circumstances, and whether an implied invita-
tion to come as a guest for friendly intercourse can create a liability
greater than that to an ordinary licensee, it is not easy to decide."
In Southcote v. Stanley, i Hurl. and N. 246, it was held, and Inder-
man v. .Dawes, L. R. I C. P. 274, agrees, that a visitor gratuitously
enjoying hospitality on the express invitation of an owner of a
dwelling house was a mere licensee. "He accepts the invitation
with an understanding that he is to enjoy only such things as his
host possesses." A guest must take the premises as he finds them,
with any risk as to their disrepair, although the host is bound to
warn him of any concealed danger of which he may be aware.
In this case there was no express invitation to plaintiff, and,
though there may be an implied one to relatives and friends, yet
strangers (there being no proof to the contrary) must be regarded
as mere licensees, present for their own curiosity or convenience,
and the defendant is not liable to them.
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Attorney's Lien - Wife's Sqparate Estate - Sale for Debt.- In
H-logg v. Dower, 14 S. E. Rep. 995 (W. Va.), the defendant, a
married woman, had entered into a contract with her attorneys
by which she agreed to pay them $4000 provided they should
succeed in establishing a certain will. She won her suit on the
will and thereby became the owner of a valuable tract of land,
but failed to pay her attorneys the sum agreed upon for their ser-
vices. In due time the attorneys brought suit in equity, claiming
that their demand constituted an attorney's lien upon the land.
The lower court decreed a sale of the land for payment of the
claim. But on appeal it was held error, and the court said :
"An attorney has no lien for his fee or compensation upon land.
* * * Viewing it simply as an obligation of a married
woman charging her separate estate, it is well settled that the
corpus of the land could not be sold, and there could be only a
renting during the coverture." Neither can there be a personal
judgment or decree against a married woman on a contract dur-
ing coverture.
.AMortgage-Parol Evidence-Admissible to Prove Absolute Deed to be
Such.-Locke v. Aoulton et al., 30 Pacific Reporter 957 (California).
The extent to which Courts of Equity jurisdiction have gone in
admitting parol evidence to prove that a deed, absolute on its
face, was in reality intended as a mortgage is well shown by this
case. In conversation with a witness, the plaintiff (who was grantee
in the deed) had said that he had loaned money upon the land, and
that all he wanted out of it was his principal and interest. The
account books of the plaintiff were introduced in evidence, and
showed that the defendant, Moulton, had been charged therein with
$1,500.00, the consideration named in the deed, being the amount
which the defendant, Moulton, had actually received from the
plaintiff as a loan. Another item of the account was $4624.50
paid by the plaintiff to discharge a prior incumbrance on the land.
Other items of the account were charges for making and record-
ing the deed of conveyance and for interest. Defendant, Moulton,
testified that it was agreed between him and the plaintiff at the
time of making the deed, that whenever the indebtedness should
be paid the property was to be deeded back. It was also shown
that at the time of the transaction between the parties, the prop-
erty was worth considerably more than was paid by the plaintiff.
The Court held this evidence to be sufficient to warrant a finding
that the deed in spite of its absolute form was in reality and effect
a mortgage.
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Master and Servant- Vegligence of Vice-Princioal.- Northern
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Peterson, 5: Fed. Rep. 182. Through the
negligence of the foreman of a gang of track repairers on the
Northern Pacific R. R., at Old Superior, Wisconsin, one of the
workmen employed in the gang was injured. Under the rule pre-
vailing in Wisconsin, the foreman and the workman, notwith-
standing the difference in their rank, are considered as fellow ser-
vants, and consequently the railroad is not held liable for the neg-
ligence of the former. But the case being brought before the
Federal Court it was held that it must be determined according to
-federal adjudications and principles as enunciated in Railway Co.
7. Ross, 112 U. S. 377, where the distinction is drawn between a
fellow servant and a vice-principal. The railroad was therefore
held liable for the negligence of the foreman, and the court quoted
with approval from the opinion of Mr. Justice Field in the Ross
case: "There is, in our judgment, a clear distinction to be niade
in their relation to their common principal, between servants of a
corporation exercising no supervision over others engaged with
them in the same employment, and agents of the corporation
clothed with the control and management of a distinct department,
in which their duty is entirely that of direction and superintend-
ence. A conductor having the entire control and management of
a railway train occupies a very different position from the brake-
man, the porters and other subordinates employed. He is in fact,
and should be treated as, the personal representative of the
corporation for whose negligence it is responsible to fellow ser-
vants. "
Mortgage -Valid when given by Preemphtor.- Norris v. Heald et
al., 29 Pacific Reporter 1121 (Montana). Action was brought to
foreclose certain mortgages given by a preemptor prior to the
time of making his final proofs. The validity of such mortgages
was brought in question, it being urged that they were grants or
conveyances within the meaning of the prohibitory clause of Rev.
St. U. S. §2262,where it is provided that any "grant, except in the
hands of bona fide purchasers, for a valuable consideration, shall
be null and void, except as provided in section 2288." The Court
held that a mortgage made in good faith was not within the pro-
hibition and was valid. After a review of the conflicting author-
ities on this point the opinion of the Court reads as follows: "From
this review we are of the opinion that the weight of authority
sustains the position that an ordinary mortgage by a preemptor
of land, prior to the time of making his final proofs, is not a grant
or conveyance, within the prohibitory clause of said section 2262."
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Telegraph CompOanies - Grant of Exclusive Right of Way by Rail-
road Co.-In Pacific Postal TelegrapOh Cable Co. v. Western Union Tel-
egra'i Co., 5o Fed. Rep. 493, the United States Circuit Court held
that a railroad company operating under a franchise from the State
did not by virtue of that franchise have the power to grant the
exclusive right to construct and maintain a telegraph line along
its road to a single company, and that a contract to that effect was
ultra vires and void. "Telegraph lines," says the Court, "are to
serve the public, and wherever they are connected with a railroad
as incidental to the railway business, the rights of the public
respecting the same must be governed by the principles applicable
to other branches of the service ; and the public policy which
underlies the numerous decisions of the Courts of this country,
denying the right of a railway corporation to divest itself of respon-
sibility and invest another with its powers and functions, touches
directly the question in this case as to the right of one corporation
to transfer to another an exclusive right for telegraph purposes to
the occupancy and control of property acquired as a necessary
means of serving the public. A contract made by a railway com-
pany, whereby it attempts to create a monopoly in the use of its
property for the transmission of news and intelligence, is just as
invalid as a contract would be whereby a railway corporation
should attempt to confer upon one individual or corporation an
exclusive right to have any particular commodity transported as
freight over its railway."
